W
ireless network security based on the IEEE 802.11 standard has received a lot of negative attention over the past few years. The attention was warranted, but 802.11 certainly wasn't the only product to suffer from poor security. For example, operating systems and browsers have also posed significant security problems. Why then did Wi-Fi-based networks become such a lightning rod for criticism?
First, there was the exponential adoption rate of the technology. Further, the security architecture did not define a threat model or security goals and was developed by a relatively closed standards body without public review or involvement of a security professional.
Of course, the security architecture for Wi-Fi networks was also the unluckiest I've ever seen. If anything could go wrong, it did. But most of the time you make your own luck-or at least set yourself up for it. Unfortunately, 802.11 was not set up for lucky breaks-just breaks, and not the kind that security professionals like to see.
I won't go through the litany of problems with 802.11-based networks as they are well covered elsewhere (www.cs.umd.edu/~waa/wireless.html and www.drizzle.com/~aboba/ IEEE/). Instead, I want to convince you that wireless security requires slightly different thinking from wired security.
In other words, wireless security is different-and not just misunderstood.
IS SECURE BECAUSE...
First, let me cover some "urban legends" surrounding wireless security.
The military uses its technology
IEEE 802.11 uses spread-spectrum signaling technology, which the military depends on for secure communications. Spread-spectrum has proved effective for a long time-it is the technology invented by actress Hedy Lamar and composer George Antheil in 1942.
However, spread spectrum also depends on randomized or secret algorithms to prevent eavesdropping-a condition that consumer-oriented 802.11 applications obviously cannot implement.
No news is good news
There are few reports of Wi-Fi networks being exploited, even though their weaknesses are widely publicized and the tools to break into them are open source. Perhaps no one is making criminal use of this information because everyone knows it is wrong to do so.
If you believe this, I know about a few bridges for sale.
The "no news is good news" logic highlights a problem that affects all forms of security-namely, the lack of metrics for making decisions about information-security investments. I recently heard a business school professor advocate a spend-and-wait strategy: Invest a certain amount of money and then wait to see if-or how many-problems occur. If you have problems, invest more and wait again.
This "hill climbing" approach may well have merit, but it also has two problems:
• It does not weigh the cost of a successful break-in: It assumes that all break-ins will be small. Computer S e c u r i t y vide a decision-making methodology-an important first step.
Successful attacks are too expensive and complex
Attacking Wi-Fi networks requires expensive and specialized tools:
• a laptop capable of running an open source *nix operating system-$300 on eBay; • an IEEE 802.11 PCMCIA card-$50 on eBay; • an Internet connection to download a few open source tools-$30 a month from your Internet service provider; • typing tar xf, make, and the appropriate cracking commandfree; • cracking a Wi-Fi network-priceless.
Relying on the technology's expense or complexity for security has been a recurring theme in the wireless space. Early cellular systems relied on it to some degree, as do current digital cellular systems. Unfortunately, this defense fails as the technology becomes cheaper and, especially as it enters the consumer space, more open to a wider audience.
End-to-end security covers it
Upper-layer protocols like IPsec and secure socket shell (SSH) provide endto-end security for network applications. However, these protocols depend on two things:
• an appropriate security infrastructure, such as public-key certificates, and • users who will always do "the right thing" when confronted with something out of the ordinary.
While the first assumption is reasonable but not widely deployed, the second assumption is not valid.
OPEN AIR IN THE MIDDLE
Users will always do what they
want-not what is right-with respect to security. Case in point: An Internet browser tells a user that the fully qualified domain name of the received certificate does not match the Web site and then gives the user an option to cancel or proceed. Do you think most people understand that a man-in-the-middle attack is likely being waged against them? I doubt it. In fact, my guess is that most people would choose to continue rather than cancel since what they want to do is to complete a transaction, not become a network security expert.
Attacks in the middle
Hop-by-hop security is important in wireless networking because attackers can manipulate the protocols underlying end-to-end protection to insert themselves as participants in the information flow. In other words, every bit between Alice and Bob also flows through the attacker. With proper endto-end security, attackers will only be able to delay or deny the flow-a problem in its own right-but this constraint assumes that everything works optimally.
With users who are unsophisticated about security and user interfaces failing to provide clear warnings, we cannot expect optimal choices or protection.
Better user interfaces would help, but they probably wouldn't solve the entire problem. In fact, SSH actually does provide a good warning for manin-the-middle attacks, but end-to-end security is a horizontal process built on top of several network layers that likely have little to no security.
To be effective against attacks, security must include a vertical component. Security is a vertical process and not one that is easily abstracted.
Easy access
The end-to-end problem affects wired as well as wireless security, but it poses a much greater threat in wireless networking because the attacker has easy access to the transport medium. In wired networking, an attacker usually must penetrate some physical security perimeter to gain network access.
But wireless networking's broadcast nature makes traditional link-layer attacks readily available to anyone wishing to create mischief. Without some form of hop-by-hop or link-layer protection, these attacks can affect unsuspecting users and, in many cases, compromise the end-to-end protection, confounding what is-when everything is just right-a robust security solution.
INTERIM SOLUTIONS
What can you do now to improve the security of IEEE 802.11 networks?
So far, security professionals have advised using upper-layer protection. That remains a good idea, but you must use whatever link-layer security you have as well. Even though 802.11's wired equivalent privacy protocol is hopelessly broken, most vendors have implemented measures such as initialization-vector (IV) filtering to counter the open source WEP-cracking tools. WEP will still fall to a determined adversary, but the new measures offer some small protection from man-inthe-middle and similar attacks.
Better still, however, is Wi-Fi protected access. WPA is an interim step toward a significantly better security architecture, and it was designed to work on most legacy hardware. This means you can probably dramatically upgrade your wireless network's security with firmware and device driver updates.
WPA includes two new protocols for confidentiality and integrity:
• the temporal key integrity protocol (TKIP) provides confidentiality by changing the key with every packet in a way that avoids WEP's encryption problems, and Wireless networking's broadcast nature makes traditional link-layer attacks readily available to anyone.
• the Michael message integrity check keeps messages from being replayed or modified.
Both protocols were designed to prevent all of the known problems with WEP-weak IVs, a small IV space, lack of replay protection, and ease of message forging. The IEEE 802.1x protocol provides access control and authentication for large infrastructures; it also supports a preshared key mode for small offices and home use.
Some vendors currently have WPA support available for download from their support site, and I'm sure more will shortly. Upgrading your current 802.11-based network to WPA is the most important step you can take to improve your security now.
FUTURE OPTIONS
WPA represents a subset of the IEEE 802.11i supplemental standard to enhance 802.11 security mechanisms. The full release, which should be available in about a year, will define a significantly better security architecture called the robust security network.
Robust security network
While WPA involved some tradeoffs to support legacy equipment-including 486-class processors running at 90 percent utilization already-RSN makes no such tradeoffs and is significantly stronger than WPA.
RSN also avoids new cryptographic algorithms, such as TKIP and Michael. Security professionals are very leery of new security protocols. Instead we prefer algorithms that have seen the test of time and significant public exposure. Consequently, I think it is wise to plan a transition to RSN-based equipment once it becomes available.
RSN uses the Advanced Encryption Standard, which the US National Institute of Standards selected to replace the Data Encryption Standard. AES will provide both confidentiality and integrity using a new mode of operation that has proved secure as long as AES remains unbroken.
Availability (not)
Confidentiality and integrity are two parts of robust end-to-end security. But what about availability?
There is no guarantee of availability in 802.11-based networks because denial-of-service attacks exist in just about every layer of the network stack. At the physical layer there is traditional radio-frequency jamming and also some protocol fun; at the link layer there are disassociate and deauthenticate messages; and at the network layer there are success or failure messages for the Internet Engineering Task Force's extensible authorization protocol.
The cumulative effect of these problems precludes guaranteed availability in current or future 802.11 equipment. Whether this is important to you or not depends on how you use your wireless network. If you use it for mission-critical and time-sensitive purposes, then it's a problem. If you don't, then it probably isn't an issue. At this time, unfortunately, no standard solution is planned to solve these problems. W ireless network security is different from wired security primarily because it gives potential attackers easy transportmedium access. This access significantly increases the threat that any security architecture must address. Unfortunately, the early IEEE 802.11 standard failed to account for it. This, coupled with several design errors, led to the wave of security problems. Fortunately, newer architectures are becoming available to dramatically increase the security of 802. 
